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Owner/Operators are inundated with recommendations generated from various hazard 
identification and risk assessment studies. While there are a plethora of qualified engineering 
firms, consultants, and in-house specialists that produce lists of executable action items, there is 
very little guidance provided to owners to aid in the prioritization and allocation of scarce 
resources to meet the performance requirements of the company’s process safety policy. 
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), through its Process Safety 
Management (PSM) standard (29 CFR 1910.119), has requirements regarding the tracking, 
closure, and documentation of recommendations from PHAs, PSSRs, incident investigations, 
MOCs, and compliance audits. However, the PSM standard is a performance-based standard; 
therefore, there is no specific language regarding prioritization and implementation of 
resolutions. The Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) has published literature such as 
“Tools for Making Acute Risk Decisions with Chemical Process Safety Applications.” This 
document provides tools that aid in the application of a consistent and logically sound approach 
to ensure that appropriate resources are made available and effectively allocated to risk reduction 
activities. Yet this guidance falls short of providing a workable process to answer the question, 
“now that I have this long list of things that needs to be done, what do I do with it?”  
 
This paper will present a practical approach for managing risks using a cost-based evaluation to 








Organizations are improving in their understanding and management of process related hazards 
and risks. They are training personnel internally or contracting with external entities to perform 
studies that identify, evaluate and control hazards that affect personnel, the public, the 
environment, business assets and continuity, and their reputation. However, organizations 
continue to struggle with how to prioritize and allocate the appropriate time, money and other 
resources to invest towards reducing the impact and likelihood of those hazards propagating 
toward an undesired outcome. 
 
Many organizations find success making decisions on risk reduction above and below two 
thresholds: one is the threshold above which risks are considered intolerable and therefore 
require immediate action, and the second is the threshold below which risks are considered 
tolerable and therefore the investment for further risk reduction is discretionary or not required. 
The difficulty arises between these two thresholds, where a multiplicity of other factors come 
into play which affects those risks which require further risk reduction. 
 
The Center for Chemical Process Safety’s (CCPS), Tools for Making Acute Risk Decisions, 
provides a cost-based, decision making approach, on the cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness of 
choosing alternative solutions to reduce risk. These approaches may be used by organizations 
where identified hazards extend beyond the property line and impact the public. The premise of 
these approaches are to estimate and evaluate the net benefits or impacts associated with risk 
reduction alternatives, incurring costs to the organization or the public, and creating a positive or 
negative effect from the project to the public; where those alternatives are measurably different 
in their implementation. The cost-benefit approach seeks to assign a dollar value to the available 
project implementation options. 
 
Private organizations have found use in adopting these model for capital projects in densely 
populated areas where there may be mutual benefit to share costs with the public, promote the 
implementation of the project having sustainability outcomes, or make decisions that may delay 
or cancel the project based on reputational risks versus modest production gains. In either case, 
these models pose difficulty in its viability when considering the geographical location of many 
chemical facilities within industrial parks and isolated locations where some of these factors 
provide very little influence.  
 
Companies need a repeatable process to prioritize capital and expense budgets to execute safety 
related projects that fall between the intolerable and tolerable thresholds in line with the 
expectations of the performance requirements of the process safety program. A practical 
approach to accomplish this goal is to: 
 Implement tools and processes to manage all safety related activities from a single 
location 
 Know your process safety performance target 
 Identify systematic and management issues 
 Have clear criteria for intolerable versus tolerable risks 
 Categorize activities to achieve the greatest risk reduction with the smallest investment 
 Provide a program level cost for the implementation of safety related activities 






A hazard register is an overview document that is useful for the compilation, categorization, 
assessment, and sorting of hazard scenarios. It plays an important role in knowing where risk 
reduction investment is required, by presenting management and those responsible for managing 
risks with a centralized location from which to make investment decisions. 
 
It is important for this register to be actively updated and managed to include all hazard scenarios 
from all hazard and risk assessment studies performed in the facility. Table 1 is a fictional 
example of a hazard register for Company X that compiles multiple hazard and risk scenarios 
from various safety studies. 










HAZOP 20170001 Increased pressure in V101 (rated for 150 psig) up to the shut-in 
pressure of P101 (~170 psig) resulting in over-pressuring V101 
with a LOPC of 150º hydrocarbon mixture to grade. 
 
Potential for personnel injury due to thermal burns. Or, health 
effect due to vaporization of a corrosive material. Or, 
environmental impact that can be remediated onsite. 
 
Inadvertently leave the 
manual block valve in 




LOPA 201710005 Loss of inventory from V102 resulting in 400 psig gas blow-by 
into the downstream equipment/piping system (rated for 150 
psig), leading to LOPC of hydrocarbon gas to atmosphere. 
 
Potential for ignition of flammable gas leading to personnel 
injury due to combustion products such as a fire event or blast 
wave. Or, health effect due to combustion products such as 
smoke, or toxic vapor generation. Or, environmental impact that 
may exceed the reportable quantity. 
 
Malfunction causes 







201710011 1.1 psig side-on pressure reached on the west and south of 
Building 100. 
 
Potential for personnel injury on the west of the building due to 
shattered glass, or flying objects on the south of the building due 
to unsecured objects on the walls and ceiling. 
2” liquid release from 
flange/gasket at the top 
of R100 
 
Note: site records 







201710026 Inability to gauge high level in the tank resulting in hydrocarbon 
spillage via the overflow vent to grade. 
 
Potential for an environmental impact due to hydrocarbons 
entering the storm sewer transferring to the first flush system that 
can be remediated onsite. 
Malfunction causes 







20170042 Pursuant to 1910.119(l)(2)(i), the MOC procedure was not 
followed which required a safety review prior to changing the 
specification for the gasket used on V100. 
 
1910.119(l)(2)(i): 
The procedures shall 
assure that the 
following 
considerations are 
addressed prior to any 
change: The technical 








Table 2. Example Risk Classification 
        
Safety Consequence Risk Classification Operational Response 
One or more fatalities (on 
or off-site) 
Urgent Requires plant manager’s approval to 
continue operation; decision to remain in 
operation requires a solution within 6 
months 
Severe injury High Must be resolved within 12 months 
Lost time from work Medium Must be resolved within 24 months 
First aid Low Discretionary 
 
Table 2 is a fictional example of the risk classification For Company X that provides guidance 
for prioritizing the completion of safety related recommendations. For the purposes of this paper, 
consequence severity is the sole criteria shown for simplicity. An action items report can be 
produced from the hazard register indicating the recommendation and the risk classification; see 
Table 3. The compilation of all hazard and risk scenarios in one location always for sorting and 
grouping recommendations that may have similar preventive or mitigative solutions. 
 
Table 3. Example Action Tracking Log 
 
Id Recommendation Risk Assigned 
To 
Due By Resolution Acceptance Reference Status 
HAZ-
0001 
Add a new PT101 to annunciate in 
the DCS at a calculated set point on 
V101. 
 
High - 12 mon - - - - 
LOP-
0002 
Close the RRF of #. One option for a 
non-instrumented means for risk 
reduction is to re-size the SV on the 
downstream piping system with a 
design case for gas blow-by. 
 
Urgent - 6 mon - - - - 
BSS-
0003 
Remove loose pictures from the 
conference room on the south side of 
the building and replace the ceiling 
fixtures with appropriate supports to 
withstand the expected overpressure. 
 
Low - - - - - - 
SAF-
0004 
Add a new LT100 and modify the 
control logic to implement a 
deviation alarm with LT102 in the 
DCS. 
 
Low - - - - - - 
AUD-
0005 
Perform a safety review of the gasket 
specified for V100, and confirm the 
currently specified material or 
change the gasket as required. 
 




OSHA’s Process Safety Management (PSM) Standard is intended to help prevent accidental 
releases of highly hazardous chemicals, thus protecting onsite personnel as well as neighboring 
plant personnel and the public. The PSM Standard is performance-based. Meaning, the 
implementation of the owner/operator’s criteria for evaluating risk tolerance is used to judge the 
program’s effectiveness. The exact specifications are not spelled out, thereby giving a facility 
flexibility to design its own program to match its needs, if it meets the desired outcome of 
preventing or minimizing catastrophic releases of flammable, reactive, and toxic substances. 
 
The flexibility granted to the owner/operator comes with great responsibility. Unlike 
specification-based OSHA standards that prescribe precise rules, such as Section 1910.23(e)(1) 
(Subpart D - Walking-Working Surfaces), which prescribes the height of guardrails, the PSM 
Standard expects owner/operators in the process industry to maintain safety programs in-line 
with current industry technology and practices applicable to their operating plants. Therefore, it 
behooves plant managers to continuously update their process safety targets in consideration of 
their peers and guidance issued by recognized regulatory agencies and national trade 
associations. 
 
Periodically conducting a process safety site assessment is an excellent means to calibrate a site’s 
process safety targets and meet the ongoing commitment to continuous process safety 
improvements. Process safety site assessments are not compliance audits. They do not focus on 
the evaluation of compliance with the elements of 29 CFR 1910.119. Rather, they focus on some 
of the tenants of CCPS’ Risk Based Process Safety (RBPS) Management approach, described in 
the CCPS book Guidelines for Risk Based Process Safety, 2007. In particular, emphasis is placed 
on: 
 Process Safety Culture and Leadership 
 Process Safety Competence 
 Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis 
 Operating Procedures 
 Safe Work Practices 
 Asset Integrity and Reliability 
 Management of Change (MOC) 
 Measurement and Metrics 
 Management Review and Continuous Improvement 
 
A major outcome of the process safety site assessment is the identification of performance gaps 
in meeting the organization’s risk tolerance criteria and systematic issues. Therefore, it is 
imperative the third-party vendor has accessors that are highly-qualified process safety 
professionals with access to a database of information of a cross-section of facilities in various 




According to CCPS’ Guidelines for Implementing Process Safety Management, a performance 
gap is normally an indication of a management system weakness. This means, the improvement 
of the process safety performance in those identified areas are within management’s control. 
Table 6.2 list examples of an example PSM Assessment Protocol. An example assessment task 
under Operating Procedures are: 
 Are employees satisfied with the completeness of process operating procedures? 
 Are operating procedures clear and easy to understand? 
 Do employees have an opportunity to make recommendations to update operating 
procedures when more efficient ways to operate are discovered? 
 Are operating procedures laid out in checklist format? 
 What systems are used for employees to access operating procedures? 
 
A possible outcome of the assessment may result in a gap between the perception of the 
thoroughness and accuracy of operating procedures from management’s point of view, and the 
actual applicability and effectiveness from the operator’s point of view. This may be due a site 
implementing a corporate format that is too general for a specific site; an operating procedure 
written in narrative form for operators to complete multiple or complex procedural steps instead 
of in checklist format; perceived inability for operator’s input; or a myriad of other root causes 
that should be compiled to identify systematic issues that can be better controlled by 
management.  
 
Strategy for Implementing Maximum Risk Reduction 
 
Once a process safety site assessment has been performed, and performance gaps identified, 
management is now in position to evaluate how to produce a strategy for maximum risk 
reduction. A qualified auditor may consider the performance gaps identified for operating 
procedures, with HAZ-0001, SAF-0004, and AUD-0005 shown in Table 1.  
 
Many facilities may or may not utilize a hazard register or like compile all safety related 
activities. Those that don’t, may have adequate processes to manage the completion of those 
activities, but those activities may be completed in isolation without the visibility to categorize 
activities across safety studies. Those that do utilize a hazard register or similar, and do not 
include a process safety assessment, may not have the visibility to identify systematic issues 
where those gaps closure can realize large preventive or mitigative benefits. 
 
Considering HAZ-0001, the PHA team identified a high-pressure hazard that was evaluated to 
produce a LOC resulting in a severe injury. The controls were deemed inadequate and an action 
item was proposed to add new instrumentation to alert operators of the change in process 
dynamics to take an action to keep the process back in a safe state. Considering SAF-0004, the 
PHA team identified a high-level hazard that was evaluated to produce a LOC resulting in a first 
aid injury. The controls were deemed inadequate and an action item was proposed to also add 
new instrumentation to alert operators of potentially faulty equipment to take an action to prevent 
spillage. Considering AUD-0005, an audit identified a failure to follow the current procedures to 
MOC all changes that affects the PSI. An action item was proposed to perform a safety review, 
as required by the MOC procedure, to ensure the installed gasket is a replacement-in-kind. 
 
The example process safety site assessment produced a performance gap in the management of 
operating procedures. A more detailed analysis derived from interviews with management and 
operators may have produced further insight into the management practices such as: 
1. Lack of leadership in emphasizing the use of procedures to include operating procedures, 
maintenance procedures, MOC procedures, etc. 
2. Lack of initial and refresher training on the use of procedures. 
3. Lack of access by employees and contractors to pertinent procedures. 
4. Lack of employee participation in the writing of procedures. 
 
Providing a resolution to the management deficiency may address the root causes of HAZ-0001, 
SAF-0004, and AUD-0005. In this example, having a checklist for the procedural steps may 
better equip the operator to properly align the valves. With this update in the procedure, the PHA 
team may deem this control along with other controls to be adequate, thusly, eliminating the 
need for a new pressure transmitter. Based on the residency time of the tank, updating the 
operator procedure to use a checklist during operator rounds, and having the operator visually 
inspect the gauge may eliminate the new level transmitter. The team may evaluate this as an 
effective control if there is more confidence in the use of the checklist and the training the 
operator receives in performing the inspection. Lastly, having continual communication from 
management with consequences for non-conformance, the findings for non-compliance may be 
eliminated because employees will be well versed on the requirements for evaluating RIK versus 
NRIK.  
 
This may change to recommendations produced in Table 3 from: 
1. Add a new PT101 to annunciate in the DCS at a calculated set point on V101 [new 
control loop added in the DCS]. 
2. Close the RRF of #. One option for a non-instrumented means for risk reduction is to re-
size the SV on the downstream piping system with a design case for gas blow-by [new 
pressure safety valve(s)]. 
3. Remove loose pictures from the conference room on the south side of the building and 
replace the ceiling fixtures with appropriate supports to withstand the expected 
overpressure [miscellaneous items]. 
4. Add a new LT100 and modify the control logic to implement a deviation alarm with 
LT102 in the DCS [new control loop added in the DCS]. 
5. Perform a safety review of the gasket specified for V100, and confirm the currently 




1. Produce plan to improve the process safety performance for the training, use, and 
management of plant procedures [administrative action]. 
2. Close the RRF of #. One option for a non-instrumented means for risk reduction is to re-
size the SV on the downstream piping system with a design case for gas blow-by [new 
pressure safety valve(s)]. 
3. Remove loose pictures from the conference room on the south side of the building and 
replace the ceiling fixtures with appropriate supports to withstand the expected 
overpressure [miscellaneous items]. 
 
The cost reduction and planning of these activities can lead to a measurable difference in the 







Table 4 shows the updated action items after completion of the process safety site assessment 
(PSSA). Action Id PSS-0001 becomes a high risk because it replaces the previous HAZ-0001, 




Table 4. Example Action Tracking Log Update after PSSA 
 
Id Recommendation Risk Assigned 
To 
Due By Resolution Acceptance Reference Status 
PSS-
0001 
Produce plan to improve the process 
safety performance for the training, 
use, and management of plant 
procedures  
High - 12 mon - - - - 
LOP-
0002 
Close the RRF of #. One option for a 
non-instrumented means for risk 
reduction is to re-size the SV on the 
downstream piping system with a 




Urgent - 6 mon - - - - 
BSS-
0003 
Remove loose pictures from the 
conference room on the south side of 
the building and replace the ceiling 
fixtures with appropriate supports to 
withstand the expected overpressure. 
 
Low - - - - - - 
 
Table 2 identifies LOP-0002 as an urgent risk which is above the tolerable threshold for 
Company X and must be resolved in 6 months. Once the SIL Determination study is complete to 
determine if the option to upsize the PSV is viable, or a SIF with the appropriate SIL rating is 
required, this action can be prioritized for immediate completion. Companies typically allocate 
funding for safety related projects above the tolerable threshold which may severely impact 
personnel safety, the environment or business continuity. Table 2 identifies BSS-0003 as a low 
risk which is below the tolerable threshold for Company X and may be de-prioritized or resolved 
as not required for further risk reduction. Table 2 identifies PSS-0001 as a high risk which falls 
between the intolerable and tolerable thresholds. If there were multiple actions that were 
classified between intolerable and tolerable, it would be very important for the owner to have an 
active plan for executing these projects within the corporate timeline for completion, or to 
provide to regulatory agencies should the timeline of completion need to be extended. 
 
A practical approach is to provide a cost basis with a plan of execution that considers all factors 
involved with the completion of each action. Table 5 shows an example of accepted resolutions 







Table 5. Implementation Plan for Safety Related Action Items 
 
Id Recommendation Risk Resolution Cost Duration Notes 
PSS-
0001 
Produce plan to improve the process 
safety performance for the training, 
use, and management of plant 
procedures  
High Produce a plan to provide to provide:  
- leadership training for senior 
management 
- gap analysis report with 
recommendations 
$$ XX - 
LOP-
0002 
Close the RRF of #. One option for a 
non-instrumented means for risk 
reduction is to re-size the SV on the 
downstream piping system with a 
design case for gas blow-by. 
 
Urgent Add a SIL 2 rated SIF in the SIS to isolate 
the bottoms transfer line on low level in 
the V102. 
$$ XX - 
BSS-
0003 
Remove loose pictures from the 
conference room on the south side of 
the building and replace the ceiling 
fixtures with appropriate supports to 
withstand the expected overpressure. 
 
Low Relocate all pictures from the south side of 
the conference room to the north side of 
the conference and an administrative 
control to prohibit loose objects from 
hanging on the wall. 
$$ XX - 
Install ceiling supports for each of the 
ceiling fixtures in the conference room to 
withstand the predicted overpressure. 
$$ XX - 
 
The development of an implementation plan with allocated costs, durations, and other specifics 
about the execution of work, allows the owner to evaluate how and when projects should be 
executed based on capital and expense budgets, timing with turn-around schedules, impact to 
regulatory expectations and commitments, and communication with stakeholders. This requires a 
third-party vendor with vast experience not only in performing process safety activities, but 
experience with procurement, commissioning and construction to provide this information 




Many companies are faced with the daunting task of managing a large collection of process 
safety action items that are often recorded and maintained in different files that may or may not 
be compatible. Their existing staffs are stretched and may be ill-equipped to meet their intended 
process safety performance targets. They have ample access to third-party vendors that can 
effectively identify and evaluate hazards and assess the risks associated with those hazards, but 
they often lack the ability to help companies produce meaningful implementation plans that 
assist companies with the operating within capital and expense budgets and in accordance with 
the expectations of regulatory agencies and their stakeholders. 
 
A practical process is: 
 
1. Compile all safety related scenarios in one location for visibility for complete evaluation. 
2. Perform a process safety site assessment to benchmark the company’s process safety 
performance against industry peers to provide the company with the best data to establish 
their process safety performance targets. 
3. Identify performance gaps in meeting the organization’s risk tolerance criteria. 
4. Categorize the actions listed in the hazard register to take advantage of improvements to 
the performance of management systems. 
5. Update the action list to show the reduction of actions that addressed the “symptoms”, 
replaced with actions that address the root cause. 
6. Segregate intolerable risks for immediate action and tolerable risk for de-prioritization. 
7. Provide a cost basis with duration and specific requirements for all risks. Focus on the 
prioritization of risks that fall between intolerable and tolerable. 
8. Work with the company to develop an implementation plan that can be presented to 
stakeholders and regulatory agencies, and provide a road map for the successful 
completion of safety activities. 
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